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ABSTRACT: 
Using a Two-stage Least Square (TSLS) regression for cross-
sectional observations of 197 countries for the year 2009, the 
study estimates the impact of: i) an improvement in the quality 
of governance on per capita income, and ii) an increase in per 
capita income on the quality of governance. In line with 
previous empirical studies, the results suggest a positive, 
strong, and statistically significant causation from quality of 
governance to per capita income. In addition, the results 
suggest a statistically significant causation from per capita 
income to quality of governance. The estimation results are 
used to interpret the relationship between governance and 
growth for the 22 MENA countries. One of the striking results 
of the study is that, despite the relatively low performance of 
most of these countries in nearly all of the six measures of 
governance,  their estimated levels per capita of income are 
higher than for the majority of the countries in the sample. 
This implies that most MENA countries have achieved a 
relatively high, but fragile, standard of living for their citizens 
in the face of poor governance.  The fragility of the standard 
of living in most of these countries was demonstrated by the 
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which had economic 
grievances as one of their key motivating factors. The findings 
of the study have two major policy implications. First, 
development requires a strong effort to improve governance, 
and second, though to a lesser extent, improving governance 
requires an exogenous increase in income through means such 
as multilateral aid. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
From the moment that the first protests erupted in Tunisia in 
December 2010, following the decision of a vegetable cart 
owner, Mohamed Bouazizi, to immolate himself over the 
confiscation of his cart and produce, economic grievances 
have played a pivotal role in fueling the wave of protests and 
uprisings in the Arab world that have already toppled the 
regimes of Tunisian President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali and 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and more recently Libyan 
President Muammar El Gaddafi, and have created serious 
political strife in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria.  With the 
exception of oil and gas-rich Bahrain, where tensions have 
been exacerbated by an age-old divide between the country’s 
Shi’a majority and Sunni political and economic elite, every 
Arab nation whose political foundations have been seriously 
threatened over the last three months has a per capita income 
that places it squarely in middle or lower-income status – and 
often with high income inequality attached.  Popular anger 
over the economic mismanagement demonstrated by various 
autocratic Arab governments – and the poverty, 
unemployment, and limited options for upward mobility that 
have resulted from it – has arguably been as important a factor 
during the “Arab Spring” in uniting fractious societies in 
opposition to the status quo as the yearning for greater 
political freedoms. Likewise, one could argue that, while far 
from the only motivating factor, economic discontent has 
played a meaningful role in driving the protest movement in 
Iran in recent years. This paper considers the historical 
reasons cited for such failures of governance among MENA 
states, and seeks to assign relative levels of importance to 
each of these factors with regards to their harmful effect on 
both macroeconomic growth, and the actual economic 
opportunities available to the general populace of these 
nations. 
By the standards of virtually any significant metric measuring 
the quality of governance in a particular country, the nations 
of the Middle East and North Africa routinely rank well below 
the global average. The findings of the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project provide 
perhaps the starkest evidence of the mismanagement and 
misrule produced by many of the region’s governments. 
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 The WGI project seeks to measure the quality of governance 
in a particular nation using six metrics: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
These metrics are measured both by a Governance Score that 
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, and a Percentile Rank relative to 
nations worldwide. 
For the Voice and Accountability metric, 19 of the Middle 
East and North Africa region’s 20 largest countries by 
population were given a negative Governance Score, and 
ranked in the 36th percentile or lower. 14 out of 20 ranked 
below the 25th percentile. For the Political Stability metric, 13 
out of 20 ranked in the 41st percentile or lower; and two of the 
nations ranked above the 50th percentile (Tunisia and Libya) at 
the time of the project’s last report (2009) would likely see 
their rankings drop in an updated study. For the Government 
Effectiveness metric, 12 out of 20 nations had negative scores, 
and 5 out of 20 ranked below the 25th percentile. For 
Regulatory Quality, 10 out of 20 had negative scores, and 5 
out of 20 again ranked below the 25th percentile. For Rule of 
Law, 11 out of 20 had negative scores, and 4 out of 20 ranked 
below the 25th percentile. And for Control of Corruption, 
negative scores were given to 11 out of 20 nations, with 6 out 
of 20 ranking below the 25th percentile. 
Explanations for the failure of the governments of various 
MENA states to provide the kind of sound governance for 
their populations that can deliver strong economic growth and 
meaningful upward mobility have tended to fall into one of 
three categories: the implementation of misguided economic 
policies that provided government officials with an excessive 
amount of authority over the allocation of national resources, 
dating to the time of the Cold War; the presence of rampant 
corruption and cronyism throughout the organs of the state; 
and the lack of accountability caused by a dearth of 
democracy and political freedoms.  For impoverished states 
with little natural resource income relative to the size of its 
population, critiques of economic policy have revolved around 
the socialist, state-driven economic models adopted by many 
Arab governments from the 1950s onward. These models, 
with their emphasis on state control of major industries, the 
delegating of major resource-allocation decisions to central 
planners, and stringent controls on foreign trade and capital 
inflows, have been cited as a key reason why resource-poor 
Arab nations have failed to keep pace with countries 
possessing more market-oriented economic policies. For 
nations awash in natural resource wealth, economic policy 
critiques have shined a light on both the harmful impact of 
heavy-handed state control by politicians and bureaucrats, and 
a general disinterest that’s often seen regarding the 
development of  export-oriented industries that are not tied to 
resource extraction. 
The explanations for poor governance that center on 
institutional corruption, meanwhile, are often quick to point to 
international studies and rankings that give many MENA 
states poor marks with regards to corruption and government 
transparency.  The harmful impact of the widespread need for 
bribes and kickbacks on both the cultivation of domestic 
industry and the attracting of foreign investment is well-
documented, as is the effect of lucrative business deals and 
favorable regulatory treatment being provided to the cronies 
and family members of prominent government officials.  And 
researchers have noted that a lack of political liberty not only 
prevents autocrats and their underlings from being held 
accountable for their poor economic judgment, by means of 
elections, but also prevents critics and whistleblowers from 
pointing out government incompetence, corruption, and 
malfeasance to their fellow countrymen. 
Considering the impact that the embrace of market reforms, 
and their implicit reduction of the economic authority of 
government officials, has had on many developing economies 
throughout the world, it is not difficult to argue that 
questionable decision-making by government authorities in 
MENA countries with statist economic systems has been a 
major detriment to economic growth. In her paper, 
Parameters of Economic Reform in North Africa, Karen 
Pfeifer takes account of the economic damage done to Tunisia 
by its bloated, inefficient public sector enterprises (PSEs), 
which grew in number from 25 in the 1960s to 400 by 1989 
(448), and the government diktats that kept them oversized 
and unprofitable. With PSEs “assigned objectives other than 
profit-maximization such as producing import substitutes...and 
not free to fire workers or raise prices,” their losses ended up 
accounting for 20% of government outlays between 1977 and 
1981 (449). The failures of Tunisia’s PSEs, and the laws that 
left them in a particularly woeful state, undoubtedly played a 
large role in Tunisia’s GDP per capita growth declining from 
an annual rate of 5.1% from 1970-1980 to merely 1.1% from 
1980-1990 (449). 
Egypt was also criticized by Pfeifer for its heavy-handed 
support of PSEs. In Egypt’s case, not only did massive state 
investment in PSEs have a detrimental effect on the domestic 
economy due to their inefficiency, they required enormous 
imports of capital, technology, and other inputs in order to 
function – thereby ironically thwarting the Egyptian 
government’s stated goal of import substitution.  Moreover, as 
the Egyptian government officials took an active role in 
managing quantities and prices for various inputs and outputs, 
Pfeifer notes that “central planning became very complex 
(442).”  After achieving 5.7% annual growth from 1970-1980, 
Egypt’s per capita GDP grew only 2.4% per year from 1980-
1990, and declined 0.5% per year from 1990-1995. As with 
many other developing economies, a state-driven approach to 
industrializing what was initially a predominantly agrarian 
economy yielded healthy economic growth at first, but then 
witnessed increasingly diminishing returns due to inefficient 
capital spending and general mismanagement. 
That corruption and arbitrary rule-enforcement is widespread 
and deeply institutionalized in many MENA countries is 
undeniable. Relying on ten indicators from several major 
think tanks, economist Tarik M. Yousef sought to compare 
 “Institutional Quality,” which measures factors such as 
corruption, the size of the black market, the enforcement of 
rules and rights, and the quality of bureaucracy, in the OECD 
and six different sets of developing nations, sorted by 
geography. In Yousef’s study, found in his 2004 paper 
Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East 
and North Africa since 1950, the Middle East and North 
Africa was given an Institutional Quality score of        -0.32 – 
ahead of only South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and well 
behind the OECD, which had a score of 1.38 (98). To make 
matters worse, with a score of -0.78, the Middle East and 
North Africa ranked last (by far) in Yousef’s rankings of 
“Public Accountability,” which measured factors such as 
political participation, civil liberties, and government 
transparency and responsiveness. OECD nations, by contrast, 
reported a score of 1.89 (98). Needless to say, Yousef’s 
findings dovetail very well with the WGI project’s ratings of 
MENA nations in the areas of Voice and Accountability, 
Regulatory Quality, and Government Effectiveness. 
However, the endemic corruption found within many 
governments cannot merely be attributed to the failings of 
autocratic governments: in many situations, cultural factors 
also appear to play an important role. In his paper, Expecting 
the Unexpected: The Cultural Components of Arab 
Governance, Lawrence Rosen remarks that “Arabs tend to 
characterize corruption not as abuse of some formal set of 
criteria associated with a given position, but as the failure to 
share whatever largesse comes one's way with those to whom 
one has forged ties of obligation (171).”  Rosen goes on to 
note how certain informants of his half-jokingly remarked that 
“corruption is our form of democracy,” since it allows 
individuals to disregard an autocrat’s rules in exchange for a 
bribe. Thus, “corruption” can sometimes take on a whole 
different meaning than what it is typically viewed as in the 
West, with the Western concept of corruption being 
sometimes tolerated, depending on the circumstances. And so, 
while potentially detrimental to economic growth, corruption 
in the Western sense of the term could remain in place to 
some extent even if political elites show a commitment to 
clean, transparent government. 
The historical “democracy deficit” of the Middle East and 
North Africa has clearly kept many autocrats (and until 
recently, a couple of others) from being held to account for 
their failure to deliver economic growth, as well as major 
improvements in other human development indicators. The 
chilling effect of the broader lack of political freedoms in a 
number of countries in the region, as manifested by 
widespread reports of journalists, writers, and activists being 
arrested and/or beaten, has also contributed to the lack of 
accountability for poor governance, as many potential critics 
are frightened into silence, lest they run afoul of the state.  
And on a micro level, evidence appears to exist that a lack of 
political freedom has a strongly negative effect on the 
governing competence of the state. In their paper, Civil 
Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government 
Projects, Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant H. 
Pritchett sought to examine the relative effectiveness of World 
Bank-financed government projects in nations that do and 
don’t possess civil liberties, human rights achievement, media 
pluralism, and the freedom to organize, after controlling for 
economic, project, and regional variables.  While the study 
found little relationship between the freedom to organize and 
performance, it found a moderately positive relationship with 
human rights achievement, and a highly positive relationship 
with both civil liberties and media pluralism (229-230). 
Given the evidence, sound arguments exist for all three of the 
analyzed factors – unsound economics doctrines, rampant 
corruption, and a lack of political accountability – having a 
harmful effect on the quality of governance in MENA 
countries, and thereby damaging economic growth. But at first 
glance at least, economic policy appears to be the largest 
culprit, given that it can be harmful not only in its own right, 
but can aggravate the other two factors. Considering the extent 
of the cultural roots of corruption in many MENA nations, it 
could be argued that the most effective solution for 
minimizing its economic impact is to migrate away from a 
centrally-planned economy, and thereby eliminating the 
power of fallible government officials to “manage” the 
economy. And to the extent that misguided economic policies 
can stunt socioeconomic development, they can also inhibit a 
variety of factors (higher education levels, a more developed 
civil society, greater exposure to the outside world) that serve 
to increase the demand for political reform. Thus, while the 
effects of an improved economic policy on the general quality 
of governance may vary tremendously from nation to nation, 
its positive ripple effects are likely to be considerable. 
II. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
The main focus of this section is to estimate the causal effect 
of governance on per capita income. The model is first 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-
stages Least Squares (TSLS). The model is estimated using 
the cross-sectional data of the 197 countries in 2009. Next, 
the estimation results are used to interpret the relationship 
between governance and growth for 22 MENA1 countries. 
Following Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), equation (1) below 
provides a parsimonious specification of the model; 
         
iii egovpgdp ++= βα ,                                (1) 
Where pgdp is the log per capita income, gov is governance, 
e represents all the other factors not included in this 
parsimonious equation, and the subscript i represents the 
country being studied. The model is complemented by the 
following equation;  
                   ii
ugovgov i +=
*                                    (2) 
                                                            
1 Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, 
and Yemen. 
 Where *gov refers to the observed governance (a noisy 
measure of actual governance) and u refers to the 
measurement error. The measurement error is assumed to 
have a zero mean and variance 2uσ . 
The main aim of the above model is to estimate the long-run 
impact of governance on per capita income. The governance 
indicator covers the six main facets of governance: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. 
Accordingly, equation (1) above is estimated six times - once 
for each type of governance. 
The second part of the empirical model aims to estimate 
reverse causality, the impact of income per capita on 
governance. This relationship is represented by equation (3) 
as follows; 
ii ii
xpgdpgov υδγµ +++=            (3) 
Where gov and pgdp are as defined above, and x represents 
geographic location measured in latitude. Similar to e in 
equation (1) above, υ  is the measurement error term with 
zero mean and a variance 2vσ   and it captures all other 
factors not included in this simple parsimonious model. 
Following Kauffman and Kraay (2002), it is assumed that the 
error terms, or the omitted variables, of equations (1) and (3) 
could be correlated together such that veveE σσρ ..].[ = , 
thereby allowing for the possibility that other factors 
affecting income per capita could be related with other 
factors affecting governance.  
Finally, as in equation (2) above, the observed level of per 
capita income  *
i
pgdp   is a noisy measure of actual per 
capita income such that;   
ii wpgdppgdpi +=
* .                                     (4) 
 where w refers to the measurement error with zero mean and 
variance 2wσ  
The leading study by Acemoglu et al. (2001) uses settler 
mortality as an instrument for institutions, assuming high 
settler mortality in a country is an indication of bad 
institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) have used colonial origin, 
as measured by the percentage of the population speaking a 
major European language. Kaufman and Aaray (2002), in 
their sample of 156 countries, use tropical location and 
colonial origin to impute the missing values in Acemoglu’s 
settler mortality data, which is only available for 56 
countries. Moreover, Easterly and William (2002) find that 
tropical weather, germs, and crops have an indirect effect on 
development, which passes through to institutions. 
Based on previous empirical literature on institutions, 
geographic location or tropical location is proven to be 
correlated with a country’s level of governance, and can be 
assumed as an exogenous variable in equation (3), or not 
correlated with other factors affecting per capita GDP in 
equation (1). Accordingly, without going through relevance 
and exogeneity tests, it is fair to assume that x is a valid 
instrument for governance. 
 
 III. DATA 
The data set consists of cross-sectional observations for 197 
countries, using the latest available data on governance in 
2009. The parsimonious model under study includes economic 
growth as the dependent variable, measured as the log of per 
capita GDP (constant 2000 US$), and taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) data in the World Bank 
database. Data on the six measured areas of governance - 
voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption - 
is taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project (World Bank database), and constructed by Kaufman, 
Aary, and Massimo. Finally, data on latitudes was taken from 
the CEPII research center databases2. 
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The main aim of the model represented in equation (1) is to 
estimate the impact of different areas of governance on 
economic growth. The equation was estimated six times, with 
the log of per capita GDP as the dependent variable in each 
instance, and the six types of governance as regressors, each 
one in a turn. Table (1) below shows the results of estimating 
equation (1) using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Two-stage Least Squares (TSLS).  
In line with previous empirical research, our results confirm 
the positive impact of improving governance on the log of per 
capita GDP. All the coefficients show a positive and 
statistically significant impact of governance on economic 
growth. For instance, OLS Column (1) shows that a one 
standard deviation increase in the regulatory quality measure 
increases per capita income by nearly three-fold in the very 
long run. An impact of similar magnitude is shown for the rule 
of law measure on per capita income.  
Using country latitudes as the selected instrument, Column (2) 
of Table (1) shows the results of the TSLS. Two things to 
notice about the results; first, the signs of all six governance 
measures are positive and statistically significant, confirming 
the results of the OLS. Secondly, in line with prior empirical 
literature such as Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), the estimated 
coefficients of the TSLS are larger than the OLS. For instance, 
using the TSLS, the impact of a one standard deviation 
increase in the rule of law measure leads to an eight-fold 
increase in per capita income in the very long run, as 
compared with only a three-fold increase using OLS. 
 
 
 
Table 1: The Causal Effect of Governance on Income Per Capita 
                                                            
2 Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
(EPII)  http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/bdd.htm 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is log per capita GDP. The table summarizes the results of   
running six different regressions.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
Figures 1 through 3 show the estimation of log per capita 
income regression on the six governance measures, with a 
95% confidence interval. Regarding the voice and 
accountability measure, as is obvious from the graph to the 
left of Figure 1, nearly all MENA states lie above the average 
estimated income per capita for the countries in the sample. 
This is very obvious for countries such as Qatar, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Few countries in the 
MENA region performed below the average for the 197 
countries in the sample with regards to the voice and 
accountability measure. More specifically, only three 
countries out of the 22 MENA nations, namely Djibouti, Iraq, 
and Yemen, lie below the regression line. Similarly, with the 
exception of Djibouti and Yemen, most of the MENA states 
lie above the average political stability score for the 197 
countries. 
A striking fact about this figure is that, except for two 
countries, Cyprus and Israel, all of the MENA states have a 
negative score in the voice and accountability measure. 
Moreover, except for Libya, Oman, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, all countries score near zero in the political 
stability/no violence measure. This finding suggests that the 
relatively high per capita income of many MENA countries is 
derived from sources other than firm governance.  
 
Figure 1: Voice & Accountability and Political Stability 
MENA countries	  
 
 
Regarding government effectiveness, Figure 2 demonstrates 
that, except for Cyprus, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, every 
MENA state is on or above the fitted per capita regression 
line. Libya, with a low government effectiveness measure, 
turns in a per capita income way above the sample’s average. 
Similarly, regarding the regulatory quality measure, Libya’s 
per capita income measure is well above the sample’s average, 
though Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen’s are below it. 
 
Figure 2: Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality in 
MENA countries 
 
Next, regarding the performance of MENA countries in the 
rule of law measure, as is obvious from the left panel of 
Figure 3, in spite of only 8 countries in the MENA region 
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Regulatory Quality
Regressors Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(1) 
Two-stage Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Intercept 7.932 
(0.091) 
7.987 
(0.199) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.992 
(0.093) 
3.422 
(1.168) 
No. of observation 189 189 
2R  0.38 0.38 
Intercept 7.938 
(0.091) 
8.025 
(0.248) 
Political Stability 1.037 
(0.095) 
4.256 
(1.789) 
No. of observation 189 189 
2R  0.39 0.39 
Intercept 7.883 
(0.065) 
7.880 
(0.071) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.353 
(0.067) 
1.747 
(0.217) 
No. of observation 188 188 
2R  0.69 0.63 
Intercept 7.868 
(0.074) 
7.859 
(0.079) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
1.279 
(0.077) 
1.660 
(0.230) 
No. of observation 188 188 
2R  0.59 0.54 
Intercept 7.929 
(0.068) 
7.936 
(0.077) 
Rule of Law 1.327 
(0.070) 
1.836 
(0.244) 
No. of observation 189 189 
2R  0.66 0.56 
Intercept 7.894 
(0.078) 
7.891 
(0.110) 
Control of 
Corruption 
1.178 
(0.079) 
2.242 
(0.434) 
No. of observation 188 188 
2R  0.55 0.10 
 scoring above zero in the rule of law measure, the majority of 
these countries land above the fitted regression line. For 
example, Lebanon and Libya, with respective rule of law 
scores of only -0.63 and -0.75, are both well above the line.  
Finally, despite the fact that almost half of all MENA 
countries perform poorly on the corruption measure, only five 
countries (Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco, West Bank and Gaza 
and Yemen) perform below the regression line. 
 
Figure 3: Rule of Law and Corruption in MENA countries 
 
 
The second part of estimating results involves the estimation 
of the reverse causality from per capita income to governance. 
The main idea behind this estimation is to check whether the 
increase in income can lead to an improvement in governance 
or not. By observing the performance of developed countries, 
for instance, it can be expected that countries able to achieve 
high income levels are also able to obtain high-quality 
governance. 
 
Table 2: The Causal Effect of Income Per Capita on Governance 
Notes: The table summarizes the results of running six different regressions.   
The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
Table 2 below shows the results of estimating equation (3) six 
times, with each governance indicator taking a turn as the 
dependent variable, and per capita income and latitude acting 
as independent variables. For the sake of brevity, column (1) 
of the table below shows the estimates of γ  in equation (3). 
As is obvious from the results, an increase in per capita 
income has a positive and a statistically significant impact on 
all governance measures. For instance, a one percent increase 
in per capita income leads to an increase of about 0.4 points in 
voice and accountability and political stability, and an 
increase of around 0.5 points in the government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption measures. 
The results of the reverse causality suggests positive feedback 
exists from income to governance. An exogenous increase in 
income, from multilateral aid for instance, leads to better 
institutions. Thus, the results indicate the presence of 
“virtuous circles” in which economic development brings 
about better institutions. 
It is important to note, however, that estimating the reverse 
causality robustly requires estimating equation (3) using 
instrumental variable regression. However, finding an 
instrument for per capita income is not an easy task, and there 
are no good instruments for income in the literature. To tackle 
the instrument problem, future extension of this study will 
follow Kaufmann and Kraay’s (2002) methodology to infer 
the slope of effect of income on governance indirectly, 
through comparison of OLS and IV results. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
A variety of factors have been responsible for the failure of 
the governments of various MENA states to provide the kind 
of sound governance for their populations that can deliver 
strong economic growth and meaningful upward mobility. As 
previously noted, the largest of these factors include the 
implementation of misguided economic policies that distorted 
resource allocation; rampant corruption and cronyism; and a 
general lack of accountability caused in large part by a 
shortage of democracy and political freedom.   
Nonetheless, in spite of these crippling factors, numerous 
MENA countries have estimated per capita income levels that 
are above the estimated average for the 197 countries in the 
sample. This implies that many MENA countries have 
achieved a relatively high standard of living for their citizens 
thanks to other factors, such as an abundance of natural 
resources. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and 
United Arab Emirates depend on oil exports as their main 
source of income. Meanwhile, major sources of income for 
Egypt include tourism, remittances from Egyptians working 
abroad, revenues from the Suez Canal, and oil. Progress 
towards the formation of democratic institutions that could 
produce greater government accountability, as well as a more 
stable foundation for an elevated standard of living, has been 
very slow in most MENA countries, with citizens enjoying 
relatively limited amount of social, economic and political 
freedom. A fragile standard of living, easily upended by 
economic shocks such as rising food costs, was a key factor 
behind the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan uprisings. 
The main implication of this study is that strong efforts are 
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Dependent Variables Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(1) 
No. of  
Observations 
(2) 
2R  
Voice and Accountability 0.380 
(0.036) 
189 0.38 
Political Stability 0.377 
(0.034) 
189 0.39 
Government Effectiveness 0.510 
(0.025) 
188 0.69 
Regulatory Quality 0.465 
(0.028) 
188 0.59 
Rule of Law 0.497 
(0.026) 
189 0.66 
Control of Corruption 0.464 
(0.031) 
188 0.55 
 needed within Middle Eastern and North African countries to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of regulatory 
mechanisms; to bring down corruption levels, to strengthen 
the rule of law, to achieve political stability and reduce 
internal violence; and to make governments more accountable 
to their own citizens. Furthermore, an exogenous increase in 
income – through multilateral aid, for instance – will feed in 
better governance. A future extension of this study will work 
on testing the robustness of the latter implication by 
calibrating the reverse causality regression, and comparing the 
results of the TSLS with the OLS. 
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